Why do governments subsidize education so heavily? This paper discusses the role of education subsidies as a redistributive device. We argue that promoting education may be a means to reduce income inequality. When workers of different skill levels are imperfect substitutes in production, an increase in the level of human capital in the economy reduces the return to education. High-skilled labor becomes less scarce, which reduces relative wages in the higher echelons of the income distribution, while low-skilled labor becomes less abundant, which increases relative wages at the bottom. The compression of pre-tax wages implies that a given inequality of after-tax incomes can be reached with a less progressive income tax. Hence, by promoting education, the distortions arising from progressive income taxation on productive effort may be reduced. Optimal redistribution policy faces a trade-off between the distortionary effect of progressive income taxation and the distortions arising from education subsidies. Just like progressive income taxes, education subsidies entail distortions. The optimal subsidy to education induces individuals to over-invest in education.
Executive Summary
Why do governments subsidize education so heavily? This paper discusses the role of education subsidies as a redistributive device. We argue that promoting education may be a means to reduce income inequality. When workers of different skill levels are imperfect substitutes in production, an increase in the level of human capital in the economy reduces the return to education. High-skilled labor becomes less scarce, which reduces relative wages in the higher echelons of the income distribution, while low-skilled labor becomes less abundant, which increases relative wages at the bottom. The compression of pre-tax wages implies that a given inequality of after-tax incomes can be reached with a less progressive income tax. Hence, by promoting education, the distortions arising from progressive income taxation on productive effort may be reduced. Optimal redistribution policy faces a trade-off between the distortionary effect of progressive income taxation and the distortions arising from education subsidies. Just like progressive income taxes, education subsidies entail distortions. The optimal subsidy to education induces individuals to over-invest in education.
The optimal level of education subsidies crucially depends on three parameters: the extent to which education compresses the wage distribution, the distortionary effect of progressive income taxation, and the political desire to redistribute income. We discuss empirical evidence showing that the economy's average years of schooling has a strong effect on pre-tax income inequality. Using these estimates, and taking the progressivity of income taxation as a proxy for the political desire to redistribute income, we compute for a number of OECD countries the level of education subsidies that could be justified on redistributive grounds. For the mean level of progressivity of income taxes in OECD countries, subsidies to education for the purpose of redistribution should account for approximately 4.4% of GDP. This is close to the actual value of 5.5%. Moreover, in line with our argument, there is a clear relationship between the progressivity of the income tax and the level of education subsidies. Our argument for education subsidies thus goes a long way towards explaining the actual pattern and level of education subsidies in OECD countries.
There is a counterforce that limits the redistributive virtues of subsidies to education.
The large literature on the ability bias in the return to education shows that education and innate ability are complementary. Subsidies to education favor therefore predominantly the high ability types, leading to a widening instead of a compression of the income distribution. Our analysis suggests that these direct income effects may be quite strong, in particular when the price elasticity of education is low. Then, a given compression of the wage distribution can only be reached by providing very high subsidies. We argue that a clever policy design, like raising the quality of education and subsidies based on parental income, may mitigate these direct income effects while maintaining the indirect substitution effect on income inequality. We also discuss some political econo my issues, such as the adequate level of centralization of decision making on education subsidies, and the time consistency of policy. Tables  33 The Centre for the Economics of Education is an independent research centre funded by the Department for Education and Skills. The view expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department for Education and Skills. All errors and omissions remain the authors.
Introduction
Throughout the Western world, education is heavily subsidized. Public expenditures on education amount to some 6% of GDP on average in OECD countries and make up a considerable share of total public expenditures. Public policy regarding education typically has a broad character. Subsidies are not confined to primary education; secondary and higher education are also heavily subsidized. Moreover, governments do not only support schooling opportunities of the disadvantaged. In practice, government programs that encourage education also favor the rich. This chapter is concerned with the question of whether governments should subsidize education so heavily and comprehensively?
The economics literature offers two main arguments for subsidies to education. Neither of them can fully account for the wide prevalence of education subsidies. First, the endogenous growth literature has emphasized that investment in human capital may have positive spillover effects in production (Lucas, 1988, and Tamura, 1991) . As these externalities are not taken into account in individual schooling decisions, education subsidies are needed to prevent underinvestment in education and to promote economic growth. The externality argument calls for subsidies directed to all educational levels and all individuals in as far as externalities are present. However, the evidence for positive externalities is mixed (Acemoglu and Angrist, 1999 , Bils and Klenow, 2000 , Krueger and Lindahl, 2000 , and Teulings and Van Rens, 2002 . Second, capital market imperfections may hinder poor individuals to finance educational expenditures and cost of living while at school (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993 , Perotti, 1993 , and Benabou, 2000 . This argument is hard to reconcile with the comprehensiveness of government subsidies to education. If education subsidies only serve to attain equality of opportunity, subsidies targeted at the disadvantaged would be sufficient. Moreover, the empirical evidence for borrowing constraints for educational choices is limited , Keane and Wolpin, 2001 , Shea, 2000 , and Cameron and Taber, 2000 .
In this chapter, we discuss a new rationale for education subsidies. We argue that education subsidies may be a part of an optimal redistribution policy. Our argument hinges on general equilibrium effects of an increase in human capital formation. When workers of different skill levels are imperfect substitutes in production, an increase in the mean level of human capital in the economy reduces the return to human capital. The supply of high-skilled workers goes up, reducing their relative wages, while the supply of low-skilled goes down, increasing their relative wages. Hence, the return to human capital and pre-tax wage inequality go down. The reduction in pre-tax income inequality implies that a given after-tax income distribution can be reached with less progressive income taxes. Hence, by promoting education, the distortionary cost of progressive taxation may be reduced. Optimal redistribution policy faces a trade-off between the distortions arising from education subsidies and the distortionary effect of income taxation.
Following Becker's (1983) efficient redistribution hypothesis, our analysis contributes to the understanding of observed institutions. Insofar as the political system has an incentive to consume Pareto improving policy reforms, our model provides a positive theory of the tax structure: observed institutions should be constrained Pareto efficient. We present some empirical evidence that observed institutions fit our model reasonably well. Our theory predicts a correlation between the progressivity of the income tax and the level of education subsidies. We present data which give some support to this hypothesis. The level of this correlation and the average level of education subsidies, 6 % of GDP, correspond surprisingly well with the predictions of the model for reasonable parameter values. Also, our model explains why cross country differences in the dispersion of disposable income are primarily due to differences in the dispersion of gross income, not to differences in the progressivity of the tax system.
Our theoretical analysis stands in the tradition of Mirrlees' (1971) Noble prize winning paper on optimal income taxation. Mirrlees considers the case where worker types are perfect substitutes, so that relative wages for various ability types are independent of supply and demand. Imperfect substitution between worker types is crucial for our analysis. Previously, Feldstein (1973) has analyzed this problem, and a whole 1982 issue of the Journal of Public Economics is devoted to the issue (Allen, 1982 , Stern, 1982 , and Stiglitz, 1982 . The conclusion of these early contributions is that imperfect substitution between types of labor does not make a great deal of difference for realistic values of the elasticity of substitution. Our claim is that this conclusion is largely due to an unresolved technical problem. Where Mirrlees applied a continuous type distribution for the perfect substitution case, a continuous type production function with imperfect substitution was not available. Hence, a production function with a discrete number of types (in practice: two types, see Johnson, 1984 , for a model with three types) was applied. Teulings (2000) shows that using a production function with only two instead of a continuum of types yields a seriously downwardly biassed estimate of the spill-over effects of minimum wages. Our claim is that the same problem applies for general equilibrium effects of an increase in the mean level of human capital, since large shifts in relative wages within each of the types are ignored.
Our analysis calls for subsidies to all levels of education. This redistribution policy contrasts sharply with the usual idea of compressing the wage distribution via compression of the distribution of human capital, that is by putting special policy effort in raising the education of the least skilled. This latter policy, that relies on direct, partial equilibrium effects, might run into trouble due to adverse general equilibrium effects which are concentrated just above the bottom of the skill distribution. The empirical evidence supports these ideas. There is a strong negative relation between the first moment of the human capital distribution and the second moment of the wage distribution, but there seems to be no relation between the second moments of both distributions. This points to promotion of education at all levels rather than at the low levels only.
However, there is a counterforce that limits the redistributive virtues of subsidies to education. The large literature on the ability bias in the return to education shows that education and innate ability are complementary (Angrist and Krueger, 1991) . Subsidies to all levels of education favor therefore predominantly the high ability types, leading to a widening instead of a compression of the income distribution. We face the remarkable situation that the role of income and substitution effects in redistribution are reversed. Usually, redistribution is brought about by the income effects of a policy (e.g. progressive income taxation), while the substitution effects (less productive effort) reduce their effectiveness. For education subsidies, it is the other way around. Substitution effects contribute to redistribution, while income effects work in the opposite direction. We derive the precise condition for education subsidies to be redistributive. Furthermore, we discuss policies which may reduce the adverse income effects, while maintaining their effect on the wage distribution.
The potential role of education subsidies in redistribution policy has become even more important in recent decades because of the widening of the pre-tax income distribution in many countries. Increases in pretax income inequality puts pressure on politicians to make the tax system more progressive and, hence, more distortionary (see Milanovic, 2000 , for recent empirical evidence). We argue that promoting education may help to reduce the political demand for additional redistributive measures. Many studies relate the increase in income inequality to rapid skilled biased technological progress. The increase in average years of schooling has not been sufficient to prevent income dispersion from rising. In Tinbergen's (1975) terminology, education has lagged behind in the race between technology and education.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the main elements of our theoretical model, based on previous work, see Dur and Teulings (2001) . Next, we review in section 3 the empirical evidence on three crucial factors in our model: the degree of substitutability in production between workers with different educational attainment, the degree of complementarity between education and innate ability, and the sensitivity of educational attainment to financial incentives. Recently, Teulings and Van Rens (2002) have analyzed simultaneously the evolution of log GDP per capita, income dispersion, and the supply of human capital in a panel of 100 countries over the period . We discuss their results in more detail. Section 4 presents our main results. First we discuss efficient redistribution policy in the case where the complementarity of schooling and innate ability is ignored. Here, we also present some empirical evidence regarding the relation between education subsidies and the progressivity of the tax system. Next, we examine how optimal policy is affected by allowing for the complementarity between ability and education. Section 5 discusses some further policy implications of our analysis. Four issues are at stake here. First, we discuss the proper level of centralization of education policy. As the effectiveness of education as a redistribution policy rests on an externality in schooling decisions, education policy should be set at a sufficiently centralized level for all externalities to be internalized (see also Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996) . Second, we analyze the consequences of a lack of commitment on the side of the government regarding income policy. We show that credibility problems bring politically feasible education subsidies half way between a full internalization of all externalities and a complete ignorance of externalities. Third, we address how to reduce the adverse effects of education subsidies on the income distribution as a result of the complementarity between education and innate ability. A clever policy design might help to overcome these adverse effects, while at the same time preserving the favorable effect of the average level of education on the income distribution. We discuss policies aimed at increasing the quality of education and education subsidies which depend on parental income. Finally, we discuss the role of non-linearities in the income policy. Our theoretical analysis is based on the idea that income policy shifts the mean of the skill distribution to the right, while it leaves higher moments unaffected. This policy works by its indirect, general equilibrium effects. However, actual policies often aim at changing higher moments, in particular by raising the educational attainment of the least skilled. Typical examples are programs like the EITC and the New Deal. These policies are intended to compress the distribution of gross income by compressing the distribution of human capital. However, as we will argue, they are likely to become the victim of their own success. Since these policies raise the supply of human capital in the lower tail of the distribution, the general equilibrium effect of this policy will reduce wages for these workers. Section 6 concludes.
The theoretical model
Our theoretical analysis follows previous work, see Dur and Teulings (2001) . Consider a society consisting of individuals who are born with different levels of innate ability, which we denote by a. They spend the first years of their life at school. Let h be the number of years spent at school. These two factors, innate ability and schooling, jointly determine the level of human capital s with which the worker enters the labor market:
where β, ξ, and ψ are (weakly) positive parameters. We come to their interpretation below.
In order to provide a clear cut separation between our model and models based on capital market imperfections, we assume perfect capital and insurance markets. Individuals can borrow sufficient funds to finance their consumption during their years of education at the going interest rate. Also, they can insure perfectly the risk on their investment in human capital due to the uncertainty about their life expectancy. Hence, individuals invest in human capital up to the point where the marginal cost equal the market rate of return to human capital. We also abstract from production externalities in schooling decisions, like knowledge spillovers.
After the investment in human capital, individuals start their working career. For the transparency of the analysis, we abstract from imperfections on the labor market. Workers therefore earn their marginal product of labor and there is no unemployment. The individual's log wage rate w (s, µ) per unit of effort depends on the individual's human capital s and on µ, the mean level of human capital among the workers in the economy. Gross income is the product of this wage rate and the effort the individual chooses to provide. We simplify the analysis by assuming that w (s, µ) is linear in s:
where γ is a (weakly) positive parameter. For the derivation of w 0 (µ), see Dur and Teulings (2001) . The partial derivative of log wages with respect to human capital, w s = exp (−γµ) is a decreasing function of the mean level of human capital in the economy. This captures the imperfect substitutability between workers with various degrees of human capital.
Were workers perfect substitutes, γ would be equal to zero. However, since the substitutability between worker types is limited, an increase in the supply of human capital in the economy (that is, µ going up) reduces the wages of high skilled workers and increases the wages of the low-skilled, or equivalently, it reduces the return to human capital. It is convenient to normalize the human capital variable s such that in some benchmark partial equilibrium of this economy µ = 0, or equivalently, the derivative of log wages with respect to s equals unity, w s = 1: an increase of s by 0.01 raises the wage by 1 %. Then, γ can be interpreted as the compression elasticity: the percentage reduction in the return to human capital, d ln w s , per percent increase in the value of the stock of human capital, w s dµ.
It is also convenient to normalize the ability measure a such that in that same benchmark, βh − ξa = 0. The marginal contribution of an additional year of schooling to the worker's human capital is given by the partial derivative of s (a, h) with respect to h:
Since βh − ξa = 0 and since w s = 1, β measures the Mincerian rate of return to schooling in the benchmark: one year of additional schooling yields a β ×100% higher wage. Empirical studies suggest β to be about 10 % per year. The term −ψ (βh − ξa) in equation (3) captures two essential features of the model. First, −ψβh captures the idea of decreasing returns to further years of education; hence the parameter ψ captures the extent to which returns decrease. Second, −ψξa captures the complementarity between schooling and ability. When ξ = 0, the effectiveness of schooling in raising skills does not depend on innate ability. Hence, optimal years of schooling is independent of innate ability. When ξ > 0, people with higher innate ability benefit more from schooling and, hence, they take up more years of schooling. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the direct cost of education and focus completely on the cost of foregone labor income. This fits the observation that the direct cost of education are, relatively, of minor importance. Individuals choose their years of schooling as to maximize their lifetime utility. The optimal years of schooling may vary between ability types. When education and innate ability are complementary, people with higher abilities go to school longer because they benefit more from education, see equations (1) 
and (3).
A worker's log disposable income d depends on her wage rate, her choice of effort, and the government's income policy. As in Mirrlees' (1971) seminal paper on optimal income taxation, the government can observe neither effort, nor innate ability, nor the skill level that is ob-tained by taking up education. It can only observe the years of schooling taken by an individual, h, and her gross log income y. The income policy can therefore be contingent on these two factors only. We simplify our analysis at this point by considering log linear income policies only:
In a non-interventionist, redistribution free equilibrium, we have:
We identify this non-interventionist equilibrium as the benchmark to which we referred previously. d y is Musgrave and Musgrave's coefficient of residual income progression and measures the progressivity of the income tax. Progressive income taxation implies d y < 1. The log linear specification implies a constant elasticity of net with respect to gross income. This constant elasticity specification implies that the marginal tax rate is increasing for d y < 1, a feature which turns out to be important for the subsequent discussion. The parameter d h measures the subsidy for taking up an additional year of education relative to the net discounted value of disposable income; d h < 0 implies a tax on education. Let λ be the cost of a year of education relative to the net discounted value of disposable income. In accordance with standard human capital theory, it has two components, the real interest rate that has to be paid for postponing labor income by staying at school for another year, and the rate of depreciation of the human capital (individuals die sooner or later); λ will typically be of the order of magnitude of 10 %. Hence, d h /λ measures the subsidies to education as a share of total cost, or alternatively, the marginal subsidy rate. Workers set the marginal cost of education equal to its return. A subsidy to education d h will therefore raise the level of educational attainment.
The government is assumed not to provide grants to students still at school. Their net income is zero and they must finance their consumption by borrowing. At first sight, this seems to be an important limitation to our analysis. However, it is not. Due to the perfect nature of capital markets, the introduction of a grant financed from a reduction of d h would be offset by a reduction of the take up of credit by individuals during their years at school, leaving their lifetime consumption path, their years of education h, and their level of productive effort unaffected. Hence, the effect of grants for students is equivalent to d h > 0. We incorporate education subsidies in the income tax system only for analytical convenience.
Individuals set effort as to maximize their utility. Hence, as in Mirrlees (1971), redistributive income taxes distort productive effort, as marginal revenue of effort from the point of view of the individual is below that for the society as a whole. Similarly, a subsidy or a tax to education distorts the take up of education. Policy makers face therefore the trade off between efficiency and redistribution. The question of interest is what combination of education subsidies (or: taxes) and income taxation yields the lowest distortion for a given amount of redistribution. We refer to these combinations as constrained Pareto efficient. The adjective "constrained" refers to information constraints on effort, ability, and skill, which limit the policy options that are available to the government. Before discussing the nature of these trade offs in greater detail, we first discuss some empirical evidence on the three main parameters of our model, γ, ξ, and ψ.
3 Some empirical evidence 3.1 The substitutability between worker types: γ A crucial mechanism in our model is that an increase in the mean level of human capital causes its return and, hence, wage inequality to fall. Raising the average years of education in the economy makes low skilled workers more scarce, raising their wages, while high skilled workers become more abundant, reducing their wages. A necessary condition for this substitution effect is that workers with different levels of skills are imperfect substitutes in production. With perfect substitution between skill types, relative wages would be independent of the supply of human capital in the economy. Katz and Murphy (1992) provide some evidence for imperfect substitutability between skill types. They estimate the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers from time series data for the US. They estimate the elasticity to be 1.4, supporting the idea of imperfect substitution between worker types. This elasticity drives the negative relation between the return to human capital and its supply in the post war economic history of the United States. Teulings (2002b) derives a relation between this compression elasticity and Katz and Murphy's elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers:
where Var[w] is the variance of wages and η low-high is the substitution elasticity between low and high skilled labor. We take the standard deviation of wages to be 0.60. Hence, when the mean years of schooling increases from 10 to 11 years, and the initial return to education is 10%, the return drops to 8%. There is substantial direct evidence for a negative relation between the stock of human capital in the economy and income dispersion. Tilak (1989) provides some early cross country evidence. In addition, there are a number of case studies for various countries. Goldin and Margo (1992) , Goldin and Katz (1999) , and Goldin (1999) examine the returns to schooling and the dispersion of the wage structure in the US between World War I and II. Educational returns clearly decreased during this period and the wage structure narrowed. Goldin and coauthors relate these developments to the enormous expansion of secondary schooling beginning in the 1910s. Only after 1980, following a period of low inflow into the university system, the return to education and the dispersion of wages started to increase again (see Card and Lemieux, 2000) . In most other countries, the education revolution started later. Consequently, the fall in the return to education and the narrowing of the wage structure also lagged behind (see Hartog, Oosterbeek, and Teulings (1993) for the Netherlands 1960 Netherlands -1985 Edin and Holmlund (1995) for Sweden; Kim and Topel (1995) for South Korea in sixties and seventies). All these studies find that income dispersion is negatively related to the supply of human capital. Figure 1 , taken from Teulings and Van Rens (2002) , provides some direct evidence on the relation between the return to human capital for some 50 countries as measured directly from individual data on the one hand, and on the mean level of education and on income inequality on the other hand. There is a clear negative relation between the return to education and average years of schooling, suggesting that skill types are indeed imperfect substitutes in production, see Panel A. Panel B relates the return to education to income inequality. There is a strong positive relationship. Taken together, the results suggest that by increasing average years of schooling, income inequality may be reduced. Some simple regressions based on the data presented in Figure 1 reveal that the return to education is about 16% for countries with no education at all, and decreases by about 0.7% for every increase of one year in the average year of schooling.
FIGURE 1 Teulings and Van Rens (2002) analyze simultaneously the evolution of log GDP per capita, the variance of log wages (which is derived from Gini coefficients), and the stock of human capital in a panel of 100 countries over the period . A theory of imperfect substitution between skill types has simultaneous implications for the effect of human capital on income dispersion and on GDP. An increase in the economy's stock of human capital reduces the return to human capital and hence income inequality. The marginal effect of education on GDP should be equal to the Mincerian rate of return to human capital, i.e. the effect of an additional year of schooling on log wages. Since this return is negatively related to the mean level of education in the economy, so should be the marginal effect on GDP:
where S is the average number of years of education h in the economy. Hence, in a growth regression, we expect a positive effect of increases in the mean level of education, and a negative second order effect of increases in the mean level of education. This interpretation of the role of human capital in the evolution of GDP contrasts sharply with the endogenous growth literature, where the relation between schooling and growth is driven by externalities. For instance, in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999) , a higher level of education makes the labor force more able to deal with technological innovations. This yields a relation between the level of education and growth, not the level of GDP, see Krueger and Lindahl (2000) for a discussion. For the dispersion of log wages, the following relation applies:
The variance is a negative function of the average years of education in the economy. Table 1 provides evidence from regressions on panel data for log GDP per capita and for the variance of log wages based on equation (4) and (5). Panel A presents a regression for log GDP on average years of schooling and years of schooling squared. The regression is run in first differences, using a ten year time frame and controlling for the level of log GDP in the previous period. The effect of a year of education on GDP according to these regressions is much higher than the Mincerian rate of human capital as usually measured, about 24%. However, due to the presence of the second order effect, this return is measured at an average level of human capital of zero. The coefficient of the second order term suggests β 2 = 2 × 0.8% = 1.6% per year increase in the stock of human capital. The regressions presented in panel B on the variance of log income (which is derived from the Gini's) provide evidence for a negative effect of schooling on income inequality. We present three regression, one in levels, one in first differences (to eliminate fixed country effects), and one where we allow only for a first order effect in S, since the first and the second order effect are highly collinear. Using the latter regression, a one year increase in average years of education reduces the variance of log income by 0.05. The effect is somewhat larger in the equation measured in levels. We can backout an estimate for β 2 from these regressions. Since Var[h] ∼ = 12.6 and using β 1 = 0.24, the coefficient of the first order term suggests β 2 = 0.09 2×12.6×0.24 = 1.5% per year. One can use these numbers to calculate the value of the compression elasticity γ implied by the estimates. Starting from a return to human capital of 10 % and using the 1.5 % decline per year of additional human capital, the compression elasticity reads:
0.015 0.10 2 = 1.5
Hence, Teulings and Van Rens's estimate of the size of the compression elasticity is broadly consistent with Katz and Murphy's (1992) estimate of the elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled labor. We apply a value of γ of 2 in our subsequent calculations. Though the estimates of Katz and Murphy (1992) are largely consistent with ours, our interpretation of the evidence is somewhat different from the usual interpretation in terms of a CES production function with two types of labor. In this two type frame work, only the relative wage of high and low skilled workers can change. Our interpretation allows for a continuum of worker types, each endowed with its own level of human capital s and with its own wage rate. In our economy these workers have to be assigned to jobs, which differ by their complexity, see Teulings (2002b) . The driving force of this model is the Ricardian concept of comparative advantage: highly-skilled workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs since skills have a greater effect on worker productivity in more complex jobs. In the Walrasian equilibrium, highly-skilled workers will therefore be assigned to more complex jobs, where their skills yield the highest return. A general increase in the level of human capital reduces the return to human capital. The basic mechanism at work is that a worker with a particular skill level will end up in a less complex job when highly-skilled workers are abundant than when they are scarce, since the distribution of job complexity is fixed (a Leontieff technology). Hence, the return to human capital, and thus wage dispersion, decrease when the mean level of human capital goes up. The size of this effect depends on the degree of substitutability between skill types. The smaller the degree of substitutability, the more the return to human capital decreases for a given increase in the stock of human capital. This model exhibits the Distance Dependent Elasticity of Substitution (DIDES) structure: the larger the "distance" of two types in terms of their level of human capital, the lower the substitutability between worker types.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 2 . When an individual worker raises her human capital from s to s + dµ while all other workers keep their human capital constant, her wage goes up by w s (µ) dµ, which is a shift along the curve. However, when all workers do the same, there is an additional, general equilibrium effect, shown as a twist of the curve to a flatter position. The mean µ goes up by dµ. Hence, the wage function twists and the return to human capital falls. This "twisting" is due to substitution processes. Since substitution effects sum to zero (for a constant return to scale economy), the workers with an above average level of human capital will lose, while the workers in the lower tier of the labor market gain. Somewhere in the middle, there is a break even point. These indirect effects of human capital acquisition on its return play a crucial role in our analysis. They can be interpreted as a distributive externality of schooling decisions. An individual's decision to invest in human capital increases the stock of human capital in the economy, and reduces, therefore, the return on this capital. It is this externality that provides a rationale for subsidies to education. FIGURE 2
Complementarity between education and ability: ξ
The redistributive impact of education subsidies through general equilibrium effects may be nullified, or even reversed, by direct income effects. When education and innate ability are complementary, education subsidies disproportionally favor people with high innate ability as they take up most education. This effect is capture by the parameter ξ. We offer a simple interpretation of this parameter that provides a simple way to estimate the parameter. Consider equation (3). Since both the cost of education and the return to education are constant (because we assumed w (s, µ) to be linear, so that w s is constant, and because of our normalizations), workers of each ability type a set h as to equate s h to some constant. Hence, h is a function of a in market equilibrium, such that βh (a) − ξa is a constant. Hence, by equation (1):
In this world, we would never be able to establish the "true" return to education s h , even if we had perfect information on the worker's innate ability. The problem is that ability and schooling are perfectly collinear, so we have no independent variation of h. Now, suppose that, from the point of view of the researcher, this is too gloomy a picture of the world. Workers do not set their years of education exactly as predicted by the model. Some have some kind of special preference for education, and choose therefore to take more education. Others simply make small optimization mistakes. This would allow us to identify s a and s h separately, with s a = 1 − ξ. 1 This suggests a simple trick to establish ξ. Since w s is constant, we can approximate s by log wages w. When we run two log wage regressions, one with only an ability variable, and another with both the ability variable and years of education, the ratio of both coefficients on ability should be equal to 1 − ξ. Table 2 presents the results of this type of regressions. Ability is measured by test scores. We use only males to avoid all the selectivity issues that arise due to women's labor supply decisions. We have data for three countries, for each at two points in time: the UK (NCD dataset and BCS dataset), the Netherlands (1983 and , and the US (1974 and 1992) .
2 For each dataset, we present two regressions: one with ability as the only explanatory variable, the other with both ability and years of schooling as explanatory variables. For the UK datasets, we have two variables for ability, one based on a math test the other on a reading test. Both are included in the regressions. This evidence suggest a value for ξ of about 0.3 to 0.6.
The sensitivity of education to financial incentives: ψ
Another important parameter in our analysis is the elasticity of demand for schooling with respect to its cost. This elasticity determines the effectiveness of subsidies in increasing the stock of human capital. The sensitivity of education to financial incentives is important when innate ability and education are complementary. Then, education subsidies favor the rich because they take up most education, which reduces the overall effect of stimulating education on income inequality. The larger is the elasticity of schooling, the lower are the subsidies that are required for a given increase in the mean level of human capital, and hence the smaller the adverse effect of subsidizing education on the income distribution. Workers set their demand for education h such that the marginal return to education, w s s h , is equal to its cost. A subsidy reduces cost and therefore the marginal return. Totally differentiating equation (3) with respect to s h and h and some rearrangement yields for the benchmark equilibrium:
where we use s h = β, and hence ds h /β = d ln s h . Since w s = 1 in the benchmark, s h dh is the relative wage increase due to dh years of additional schooling. Hence, parameter ψ is the inverse of the elasticity of the value of human capital with respect to the cost of education. Stanley (1999) analyzes the effects of the GI Bill education subsidies for veterans from WW II and the Korean war on their educational attainment. The GI Bill reduced the cost of education by 50 % for Korean veterans and even by 60 % for WW II veterans. However, not all veterans of the Korean war were entitled to this subsidy, depending on a completely arbitrary rule regarding the date of enlistment. This "random" selection provides a natural experiment for testing the effect of financial incentives on educational attainment. The effects of these subsidies are necessarily limited to veterans with higher educational attainment, since they left the military at the age of 23. At that age, a substantial fraction has completed its investment in human capital. This fits the observation: only 40 % of the Korean veterans who were eligible took up any grants at all. Consistent with this observation, the veterans that took up grants descended predominantly from parents with a higher social economic status (SES). The 40 % that used the subsidies have increased their educational attainment on average by 1/3 year. Were the subsidy effective for all education levels, the effect would have been 1 3×40% ∼ = 0.85 year. The elasticity of demand for years of schooling with respect to its cost, s h dh/d ln s h , can be derived by dividing through the subsidy rate and multiplying by s h : 0.10×0.85 50% = 0.17, or ψ = 6. For WW II veterans, the data allow a more refined disaggregation by SES. There, the upper quintile of the SES distribution achieves a gain in educational attainment of even 2 years. Hence, the semi-elasticity is:
0.10×2 60% = 0.33, or ψ = 3. One might suppose that for the group of veterans the cost of education has been higher than it would have been in case their educational career had not been interrupted by the war. We use a value for ψ of 4 in the subsequent calculations.
4 Efficient redistribution policy 4.1 Efficient redistribution without complementarity: ξ = 0 same years of schooling and education subsidies have no direct effect on the income distribution. The only way in which education subsidies affect the income distribution is through general equilibrium effects on the labor market. If the compression elasticity is positive (i.e., skill types are imperfect substitutes), education subsidies contribute to redistribution. The optimal level of education subsidies depends on the political demand for redistribution as well as the distortionary effects of the policy instruments.
The following equation describes for any level of income tax progression the constrained Pareto efficient level of education subsidies as a percentage of the cost of education:
where η is the wage elasticity of effort supply. In the absence of a strive for redistribution, d y = 1, optimal education subsidies are equal to zero. Hence, the redistribution free equilibrium, d y = 1, d h = 0, is constrained Pareto efficient. This mirrors the first theorem of Welfare economics: with perfect markets, investment in human capital is Pareto efficient. If there is no demand for redistribution, the best a policy maker can do is not to intervene in the market mechanism. When the government wants to redistribute income from rich to poor, both progressive taxes and education subsidies should be used, since in (6), if d y < 1 then d h > 0. Education subsidies are optimal in our model for two reasons, corresponding to the two terms within square brackets. The first term captures the effect that education subsidies offset the disincentive effects of increasing marginal tax rates on schooling. Progressive income taxation implies that the benefits of education (higher future earnings) are taxed at a higher rate than foregone earnings. Therefore, individuals underinvest in human capital, which should be corrected by providing education subsidies, see Bovenberg and Jacobs (2001) . The relevance of this effect depends on the functional form of the tax scheme. Our log linear system does indeed imply increasing marginal rates. However, a linear scheme would not yield this effect, since then marginal rates were constant. Hence, we do not want to stress this effect here. It just shows up due to the convenient log linear specification of income policy.
The second term refers to the general equilibrium effects of education, which are relevant when types of labor are less than perfect substitutes, γ > 0. Then, a constrained Pareto efficient income policy requires a subsidy to education above the subsidy required to offset the distortions of the income tax. By encouraging schooling, wages are compressed, implying smaller pre-tax income inequality. Hence, a given after-tax income distribution can be reached with less progressive income taxes, and hence less distortionary cost of progressive taxation. Just like progressive income taxes, education subsidies entail distortions. The optimal subsidy to education induces individuals to overinvest in education. The distortion in the schooling decision due to the education subsidy is traded off against the distortion in the effort decision due to marginal tax rates. The optimal redistribution policy mixes both distortions, in line with the principles of tax smoothing. The higher the compression elasticity, γ, the stronger the compression of relative wages by additional investment in human capital, and hence the higher is the optimal value of education subsidies. For the relevant range of η < 1, the optimal subsidy is increasing in η. The more elastic the supply of effort η, the higher the distortion caused by marginal tax rates, and hence the higher is the optimal subsidy to education. Note that the price elasticity of the demand for schooling does not show up in this equation. Since the schooling decision is distorted by both progressive taxation and subsidies to education, the elasticity (measuring the size of the welfare loss) does not affect the ratio between income taxes and subsidies to education.
The subsidy to education can be interpreted as a Pigouvian subsidy to offset an externality in individual schooling decisions. When deciding to take up an additional year of education, the individual raises the mean level of human capital in the economy and therefore compresses wage differentials. This generates both positive and negative income effects for other workers. The value weighted sum of these effects is exactly zero (as applies always for substitution effects in constant returns to scale economy). However, this compression effect is a positive externality from the point of view of the policy maker, who wants to redistribute income from the rich to the poor and who can do so only at an efficiency cost when using other instruments. We refer to this effect as a distributional externality.
Some empirical evidence on efficient redistribution
When we follow Becker (1983) and interpret our model as a positive theory of the policy mix used for redistribution, the model predicts that countries with a stronger preference for redistribution and hence, a stronger progressivity of the tax system, have higher public spending on education. Figure 3 , taken from Van Ewijk and Tang (2000), provides some evidence. There is a clear negative relation between the progressivity of the income tax and the level of education subsidies. FIGURE 3
Remarkably, the actual level of subsidies to education and its relation to the progressivity of income taxes is close to what our model predicts. Clearly, when taxes are proportional (d y = 1), subsidies to education should be zero. This is consistent with the data in Figure 3 . The model allows a crude calculation of the optimal level of subsidies to education as a share of GDP. The efficient level of education subsidies for redistributive purposes depends on the values of η and γ (see equation (6)). As discussed in the previous section, an empirically plausible value for γ is 2. Similar to Diamond (1998), we assume the supply elasticity of effort η to be equal to a half. The coefficient of residual income progression (d y ) is on average 0.85 in OECD countries (see also Figure 3 ). Hence, for the average OECD country, imperfect substitution justifies a subsidy to education of approximately 7 % of the cost of foregone labor income:
Suppose that the average worker takes up 10 years of education, which is a reasonable value for OECD countries, and suppose that labor accounts for 2 3
of GDP. Then, subsidies to education as a percentage of GDP should be:
×10×0.44×0.10×(1 − 0.85) = 4.4 %. For the mean level of progressivity of income taxes in OECD countries, subsidies to education for the purpose of redistribution should account for approximately 4.4 % of GDP. This is close to the actual value of 5.5%. Our argument for education subsidies thus goes a long way towards explaining the actual pattern and level of education subsidies in OECD countries.
Allowing for complementarity of ability and education
When we allow for complementarity between education and innate ability, it is no longer clear whether education subsidies contribute to redistribution of income from rich to poor. On the one hand, by stimulating human capital formation, education subsidies reduce wage dispersion because skill types are imperfect substitutes in production. On the other hand, the complementarity between education and ability implies that individuals with high ability go to school longer. Since the amount of education subsidies is increasing in the years of education an individual takes up, education subsidies disproportionally favor the people with high ability. Hence, the complementarity of education and ability may cause education subsidies to increase income dispersion. The constraint Pareto efficient level of education subsidies allowing for complementarity between ability and education is described by:
where ψ is the inverse of the elasticity of educational attainment with respect to the cost of education and where the parameter ξ measures the degree of complementarity of innate ability and years of schooling in the production of human capital. The higher ξ, the greater the difference in the take up of education between high and low ability types. Hence, the higher this parameter, the greater the direct, regressive effect of subsidies to education. The first term between square brackets in equation (7) is again the subsidy to education needed to correct for the distortionary effect of progressive taxation on the schooling decisions. Like in the previous section, we ignore this effect in the subsequent discussion. The second term implies that if ψξ < (1 − ξ) γ, then education subsidies are an efficient redistributive instrument next to progressive income taxation. The condition has a simple economic interpretation. The parameter ξ is the share of wage dispersion that is attributable to the cost of human capital acquisition, while ψ is the inverse of the elasticity of educational attainment with respect to the cost of education. Hence, the left hand side is the adverse direct effect of the subsidy: the increase in inequality due to a subsidization of the cost of human capital acquisition per value unit increase in the average human capital. The right hand side measures the reduction in inequality: 1 − ξ is the share of wage dispersion that is directly attributable to ability differentials, while γ is the compression elasticity, measuring the relative decrease in the return to these ability differentials per value unit increase in human capital.
Whether the condition ψξ < (1 − ξ) γ is satisfied is extremely sensitive to the exact empirical values of the relevant parameters. For the values discussed before, both sides of the inequality are just equal, which implies that the direct income effect of education subsidies is as large as the indirect substitution effect. Hence, education subsidies do not contribute to redistribution. Much depends, however, on what one believes about the price elasticity of the demand for education. The higher the elasticity, the more education should be subsidized. The intuition is straightforward: the higher the elasticity, the lower education subsidies need to be for a given compression of wages, the smaller is the direct income effect. Moreover, a clever policy design may mitigate the direct income effects while maintaining the indirect substitution effect on income inequality. Examples of this will be discussed in subsections 5.3 and 5.4.
Further implications

The adequate level of centralization
Our argument for subsidizing education rests on an externality in individual schooling decisions. Individuals do not take into account the effect of their schooling on pre-tax wage inequality and, thus, on the distortions arising from progressive income taxation. Decision making must be sufficiently centralized to internalize externalities.
Consider the case of a small district in a large country. Either labor is mobile or there is free trade of products between districts, or both. Hence, by the Heckscher-Ohlin factor price equalization theorem, relative wages are then determined by the nation wide skill distribution, not that in the own district. Evaluated at the decentralized level, education subsidies increase the dispersion of utility when ability and education are complementary. Since the district is too small to have an effect on relative wages in the economy, the only distributive effect stems from the complementarity between ability and education in skill formation. Without complementarity, education subsidies are only used to offset the distortionary effect of increasing marginal tax rates on schooling decisions. With complementarity, progressive taxation is combined with a subsidy to education which is lower than the subsidy needed to offset tax distortions. When there is strong complementarity, even a tax on education may become constrained Pareto efficient at the decentral level. Clearly, taxing education contributes to redistribution as high-ability types take up more education than low-ability types. The (local) distortionary effect on schooling decisions is traded off against the disincentive effect of the other redistributive instrument, progressive taxation. Since the general equilibrium effect of education subsidies on relative wages is not taken into account at the decentralized level, subsidies are inefficiently low. Hence, decentralization yields underinvestment in human capital.
The case discussed above matches closely the US institutional structure, where decisions on education are made at the level of school districts. The main difference is that the tax policy is decided predominantly at a federal level. This feature of the US system may strengthen our result that decentralized bodies provide too low subsidies to education. The reason is that central decision making on taxes introduces an additional externality in decentral decision making, discouraging investment in human capital. While in the analysis above the direct consequences of underinvestment in human capital for the government budget are fully taken into account, this is no longer the case if local income is subject to federal taxes. Studying these issue more fully would require the introduction of separate budget constraints for the school district and the federal government.
Time consistency of the policy
So far, we have studied optimal income policy from the perspective of an individual at the beginning of his life. Moreover, we have assumed that the optimal income policy is set once and for all. In this section, we relax both assumptions to gain insight into the political viability of education subsidies in a world where the decisive voter has already started his working career and cannot commit to future policies.
Consider a dynamic economy where old generations die and new generations enter the labor force. Inhabitants differ along two dimensions. First, they are either at school or working. Second, they differ according to their ability level. For simplicity, we assume that while at school, inhabitants vote as if they are working. In this way we ignore slight differences between the interest of those at school and those working. The main interest is within generations: the low ability people have an interest in past accumulation of human capital (because of general equilibrium effects on relative wages) and today expropriation of the fruits of human capital (for redistribution).
The temptation to expropriate the fruits of past human capital formation conflicts with the desire to stimulate current human capital formation by young generations. In particular, consider the median voter at a particular point in time. He is tempted to ignore the effect of income policy on schooling decisions. Since years of schooling are assumed to be observable, this implies that he can fully expropriate the high ability types who have taken up more education (since innate ability and education are complements). However, in that case, future generations of new entrants will no longer invest in education. This will gradually depress the mean education level among the workforce, thereby raising gross wage differentials, at the expense of the median voter. Since the median voter expects to live beyond today, he is also negatively affected by this long run negative effect on his gross wage rate.
Interestingly, one can prove that when voters cannot commit on their future voting behavior, the political process brings the economy exactly half way between complete internalization of redistributive externalities of schooling decisions and complete decentralization, where externalities are fully ignored, see Dur and Teulings (2001) . At that point, the temptation to expropriate past investments in human capital is exactly offset by the fear of adverse general equilibrium effects by lower future investments. The lack of ability to commit to future voting behavior works to the detriment of the lower half of the income distribution, which gets less redistribution than with commitment. It is therefore in their interest to seek ways to commit not to tax investments in human capital in the future. For that reason, it may be important not to allow years of education to be a variable in the tax system. As soon as that variable enters the system, it opens the door for debate on heavier taxation of human capital in the future. The debate alone is enough to undermine the credibility of the incentives for investment in human capital, and thereby their effectiveness. Therefore, it may be much better to frame subsidies to the education system in the form of irreversible grants during the years at school or of direct subsidization of the schools themselves, since this type of subsidies are much more credible.
Subsidies to schools versus grants for students
The conclusion of section 4.3 that the direct and the indirect general equilibrium effects tend to cancel in the simple log linear set up, does not imply that we should forget about raising the level of education as an efficient redistribution instrument. Education subsidies make most sense if one can find policies that limit the direct income effect while at the same time maximize the effect on the mean level of human capital. Such more sophisticated policies are observed in practice. For instance, in the present model, the only cost of education are foregone earnings, keeping the quality of the education system fixed. One could extend the analysis to the trade off between the quality and the direct cost of the education system. Then, a typical policy parameter might be the quality of education in general, and of primary education in particular. Leuven, Oosterbeek, and Van Ophem (2002) show that there are considerable differences in the quality of education across countries. An eyeball test suggests these differences to be related to the amount of government subsidy to the education system. The big advantage of raising the quality of primary education is that it has no adverse income effects and is likely to raise the average skill level in the economy. However, depending on the exact specification of the education production function s (a, h), the greater quality of primary education might be just offset by people by reducing their years of schooling, since there marginal cost and revenues remain equal. A general increase in the quality of education might be a more attractive alternative, as it opens quality of education as a second dimension for substitution next to years of education. The greater the total elasticity of educational attainment to incentives, the cheaper it is for the government to increase the average level of education by subsidies, and in particular, the less subsidies need to be paid to high ability types who take up a lot of education.
Subsidies based on parental income
Another option for improving the effect of a given amount of subsidy on the average education level in the economy is to include intergenerational information in the subsidization scheme. The social economic status of the previous generation is a good indicator of the expected educational attainment of the next generation, partly by nature effects, partly by nurture, see Plug and Vijverberg (2002) . On average, kids of low education families drop out the education system at a younger age and with a lower skill level. An optimal subsidy to education operates at the margin, to invoke people to stay at school longer. The problem is that the margin is located at a different point for each skill group, so that high skilled workers benefit along the whole range. By using the educational attainment of the previous generation, subsidies can be tailored more precisely to the margin, improving the ration of beneficial incentive effects versus adverse income effects. In practice, this boils down to subsidies that are conditional on parental income, an institution that is widely applied.
Direct compression of the human capital distribution?
Many policies are geared towards direct compression of the human capital distribution. The recent Luxembourg and Lisbon summit of the EU have again focussed the efforts for investment in human capital on raising the level of education of least skilled. From a distribution point of view, this seems to be an obvious idea as it raises the human capital of the most disadvantaged group. However, a second thought reveals a number of complications. First, relative to the free market outcome, it is much simpler to raise everybody's skill level by a bit than to raise a particular group's skill level by a lot, since the dead weight loss increases quadratically with the deviation from the market outcome. Second, the general equilibrium effect of stimulating human capital accumulation in the lowest strata of the distribution work perverse: they raise supply in the lower part of the distribution, thereby reducing relative wages of the least skilled, see Teulings (2002b) for a detailed analysis. Table  1 provides some, though far from conclusive empirical evidence on this issue. The regressions in Panel B include the variance of education as explanatory variable (V t ). The effect of this variable on the variance of log wages is close to zero. Hence, the direct effect of a compression of the variance of education on the variance of earnings is fully offset by adverse general equilibrium effects. The argument is very much comparable to the discussion on min-imum wages. An increase in minimum wages reduces labor supply at the bottom of the labor market, thereby increasing the relative wages of their best substitutes, slightly better skilled workers. The argument is illustrated in Figure 4 . Suppose that we introduce a minimum wage, that eliminates the left tail of the human capital distribution, reducing the effective supply of low skilled workers. Firms will shift their demand for these low skilled workers to the closest available substitute, slightly better skilled workers, type s + . Hence, the introduction of the minimum wage will increase the wages of type s + workers substantially. Firms that used these type s + workers before the introduction of the minimum wage will find their cost having been increased. They will substitute to the closest substitute, type s ++ workers, s ++ being slightly higher than s + . Hence, their wages go up, but by slightly less than the wages of type s + . This yields the type of pattern shown in Figure 4 , with large spillover effects of an increase in the minimum wage to workers earning wages just above the minimum. This type of pattern has been documented for the United States by Lee (1999) and Teulings (2000 Teulings ( , 2002a . A decrease of the minimum wage by 10 % causes the wages of workers earning slightly more than the minimum to go down by 8 % (Teulings, 2002a) . Basically, all of the increase in inequality in the lower half of the labor market in the United States during the eighties can be explained by the fall in minimum wages.
FIGURE 4
Similarly, programs like the EITC and New Deal can be victim of their own success. The large subsidies to the employment of the least skilled raise their supply, and thereby invoke adverse general equilibrium effects, which might undo the gains of the initial subsidies. The only net effect would be an increase in the marginal tax rates for the better skilled workers to finance the subsidies to the least skilled. Raising the level of human capital of the workforce as a whole seems far more effective from a distributional point of view.
Conclusion
The general equilibrium effect of investment in human capital provide a forceful argument for the subsidization of education for a government that wants to redistribute income. Previous studies on optimal taxation have always downplayed the importance of general equilibrium effects. The reason that these effects show up much more prominently in this study is that we use a more realistic production technology, based on comparative advantage of high skilled workers in complex job types. Contrary to for example a two type CES technology, this production technology implies that the whole wage schedule becomes flatter as a result of an increase in the average stock of human capital. An efficient redistribution policy should therefore combine progressive income taxation and subsidies to the formation of human capital. Crude calculations suggest that this model provides a rationale for subsidies to the education system of about the level that we observe empirically. Moreover, the model suggests positive cross country relation between the progressivity of income taxes and the rate of subsidization of the education system: the more redistributive a country's income policy, the higher will be both the progressivity of the tax system and the subsidy to education system. This relation is also borne out by the data, with a slope that fits the theoretical predictions closely.
However, there is an effect working in the opposite direction. Since the take up of schooling is complementary to innate ability, the direct effect of a subsidy to education tends to favor high ability types. Our overview of some empirical studies suggest that both effects cancel. Much depends on what one believes about the price elasticity of the demand for education. The higher the elasticity, the more education should be subsidized. Moreover, the result that the direct and the indirect more or less cancel does not imply that we should forget about the argument. The simple log-linear income policy analyzed in this paper is applied merely for reasons of tractability. One can think of more elaborate schemes that increase the substitution effects of education subsidies, while at the same time reduce the adverse income effects, in particular policies aimed at raising the quality of education and grants for students which depend on parental income.
The log linearity of the income policy imposes another strong restriction. It implies increasing marginal tax rates (for d y < 1), offending the logic of the Sadka (1976) argument for low marginal rates at both ends of the income distribution. Interestingly, this argument can be extended towards education subsidies, but then reversed. Where in the case of income taxation, the income effects are desired for the purpose of redistribution while the substitution effects only cause efficiency losses, here the substitution effects contribute to the redistribution while the income effects work in the opposite direction. Hence, the marginal rate of education subsidies should be high at the bottom and at the top, where they do not cause substantial income effects since there are no people earning less than the lowest or more than the highest income. The previous argument regarding the quality of primary education exploits this idea at the lower end of the distribution. Where this idea fits the layman's intuition, its counterpart is more surprising. A subsidy for top education programs has little adverse income effects (since there are not many people taking up more years of education), while it raises the average level of education. The production function applied in this paper implies that all lower ability types will benefit from the general equilibrium effects of this policy, see Teulings (2002) .
The analysis of the optimal functional form of taxes and education subsidies has strong policy implication for programs like the EITC and the New Deal, along the lines suggested by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1999) . These programs aim at a reduction of marginal tax rates for the lowest ability types in order to combat low-skilled unemployment. The government budget constraint then dictates that marginal rates should be increased for higher ability types. The logic of the argument in this paper suggests that this policy will be victim of its own success. To the extent that the subsidies induce low ability types to go to work, the relative increase in low skilled labor supply will reduce their wages, thereby partially undoing the initial effect of the subsidy. Stated more crudely: there is limit to the demand for hamburger flippers. If we use tax policy to increase their supply, sooner or later their gross wages will fall. At the same time, the increase in marginal rates for somewhat higher skill types, which is necessary to satisfy the government budget constraint, reduces the incentive for investment in human capital, which further aggravates the problem. This points to the need of a more formal analysis of the functional form of the optimal policy. Controls for year effects, year x S, and all variables in levels one year lagged. 
